By L.Y Nordenfelt
This booklet is a contribution to the overall philosophy of motion and the philosophy of welfare. the writer makes separate analyses of ideas equivalent to motion, skill, interplay, action-explanation, happiness, healthiness, ailment and incapacity. even as he explores and substantiates the belief of a robust interdependence among the concept that of motion and a few of the significant innovations of welfare, specifically healthiness and sickness and comparable concepts.
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Extra resources for Action, Ability and Health: Essays in the Philosophy of Action and Welfare (International Library of Ethics, Law, and the New Medicine)
According to a common and very reasonable view, intentions are such states of an agent as are the result of a certain kind of mental actions, viz. decisions. On this view, to decide is tantamount to forming an intention. An even stronger contention is to say that intentions can occur only as a result of decisions. I shall in the following adopt the weaker view of the connection between decisions and intentions. I shall say that decisions are the typical causes of intentions and that "to decide to bring about P" in fact means: to form the intention to bring about P.
And obviously it is A 's belief, although possibly mistaken, which will determine the choice of action. Thus, when A intends to bring about P she is disposed to perform, not those actions which are as a matter of fact necessary for the realisation of P, but those actions which she believes are necessary for the realisation of P. Such a relation of necessity can be of various kinds. g. g. g. to run is a logical requisite for winning the running race). (i) Consider then the following rectified explication: A intends to bring about P, only if A is in astate which is such that (i) A believes that she can bring about P, and (ii) For all actions X; if A believes that she cannot bring about P unless she does X; and if A can do X; then A will do X.
CHAPTER2 22 In analogy with intentions I shall suggest that wants are a kind of dispositions. I shall not, however, say that they are dispositions to act (in general). e. intentionally forrning an intention) or dispositions of a non-agentive (natural) kind where the consequent is an intention. To want to bring about astate of affairs P, then, is, I shall say, to be disposed to intend to bring about P. What then is the more specific nature of this disposition? Consider below the conditions under which a particular agent's want to perform F may result in adecision to perform F.